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Abstract
This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the
principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority
and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; how-
ever, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority. Hence,
delegation can provide a way to manipulate the principal’s ex post reputa-
tion. In general, the principal keeps the authority too often when she has
the opportunity of delegation. When the evaluator believes that the agent
may make the decision sometimes, the principal has less incentive to make
the right decisions.
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Delegation of the decision-making authority from the decision makers to their sub-
ordinates has been an important issue in organization theory. For example, in
Congress, where policy is made, by legislature or through delegation to the bureau-
crats, has a signiﬁcant impact on policy outcomes.1 In the internal organization
of ﬁrm, the allocation of decision-making authority between a CEO and division-
managers, or between a division manager and her subordinate is important in ﬁrm’s
performance.
One conventional explanation of why the principal delegates the authority to
the agent is to take advantages of the agent’s expertise and reduce her workload.
However, due to conﬂict interests and asymmetric information, the control cannot be
perfect. Therefore, as argued in Aghion and Tirole (1997), the principal thus faces
a trade-oﬀ between a loss of control and a loss of information: when the principal
delegates the authority, it provides the agent the incentive to acquire information,
which results in better quality of information; however, diﬀerences in preferences
between the principal and the agent lead to biased decisions. When communication
between the principal and the agent is possible, Dessein (2002) shows that delegation
can be always better than informative communication. Harris and Raviv (2001)
consider the case where the principal also has private information and conclude that
the principal prefers delegation to communication when the agent’s information is
relatively important. Sometimes, the principal may delegate more often even when
1The literature has been paying much more attention on the optimal “degree of delegation”
in controlling the agency problem. For example, Epstein and O’Halloran (1994) show that when
Congress has appropriate administrative procedures, which include ex ante delegation and ex post
veto, it will delegate a large degree of authority, regardless of their diﬀerences in policy preferences.
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) observe that Congress keeps authority the most in issues of budget,
rules, ways and means, but delegates the authority to the executive the most in areas of agricultural
and public works, and armed services. Gailmard (2002) introduces the bureaucrat’s subversion into
Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1999) model, which leads to less delegation.
1the agent is more biased.
In this paper, we propose another reason for the principal to delegate the decision-
making authority; namely, her reputation concerns. It matters when the outside
evaluator cannot observe the principal’s preference on making the appropriate de-
cisions, nor the allocation of authority. That is, the outside evaluator can only
conjecture about the principal’s type and who makes the decision from the decision
outcomes. Therefore, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ: she can either keep the author-
ity and choose her ideal action, or she can increase her ex post reputation and make
use of the agent’s expertise by delegation.
When the allocation of authority is ﬁxed or beyond the principal’s control, from
the evaluator’s view, the agent’s discretion is better than the principal’s discretion,
simply because the agent has a better chance to make the right decisions. That
is, delegation is always better for the evaluator. On the other hand, when the
principal can choose the allocation of authority, and the evaluator cannot observe
it, the principal can manipulate her ex post reputation by her delegation policy. In
general, the principal keeps the authority too often when delegation can be an option.
When the evaluator believes that the agent may make the decision sometimes, the
principal has less incentive to choose the right decision.
Reputation concern has diﬀerent eﬀects on delegation policy for the principal of
diﬀerent types. When reputation is less important, the biased principal would like
to keep the authority and make her ideal policy. The good one is indiﬀerent between
keeping the authority and delegation, because in both cases, she prefers correct deci-
sions. When reputation is important, the biased principal prefers delegation because
it is costly to make the biased policy. The good one prefers keeping the authority,
and makes a diﬀerent policy to distinguish from the biased one. When reputation
concern is intermediate, then it is possible that both types delegate sometimes. Since
delegation is always better for the evaluator, the case is the best for the evaluator.
2Our work is closed to Levy (2000), although delegation is not an option in her
model, in that the principal cares about both the appropriate decisions and her
reputation, and she can consult the agent before making the decisions. Levy shows
that the more competent principal, the less she consults: in order to show the
evaluator that she is better than the agent, she takes the actions contradicting the
agent’s advices, and thus in equilibrium, it results in too much contradictions, i.e.,
anti-herding.2
In the literature on contract or organization theory, the importance of observ-
ability of contracts to the principal’s reputation concerns has not yet been explored
much.3 In politicians/bureaucrats relationship, politicians care about re-election.
If voters cannot observe who makes the decisions, then politicians can manipulate
their reputation by their delegation policy. Our results imply that politicians tend
to delegate the authority of making some unpopular policies (in that politicians
would look biased if they made such policies), for example, pork barrel programs,
and shift the blame to the bureaucrats, as long as the voters believe that politicians
are not responsible for all the decision-making.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 discusses the equilibrium under the principal’s discretion and under the agent’s
discretion, when the regime is ﬁxed. Section 4 analyzes the principal’s optimal
allocation of authority. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2Other researchers care about the agent’s career concerns, which has been recognized as a cause
for information loss and ineﬃcient decision making. See, for example, Morris (2001), Ottaviani
and Sørensen (2002), and Scharfstein and Stein (1990).
3In the example of labor market, Andersson (2002) considers the case where the labor market is
not able to observe the contracts between workers and their (former) employers, but only workers’
wages. However, with workers’ career concerns, they work too much in order to be evaluated higher
in the market. With observable contracts, on the other hand, career concerns have no eﬀects on
workers’ incentives in eﬀorts.
32 Model
There are three players in the communication/delegation game: a principal (she),
an agent (he), and an outside evaluator. For example, we can interpret the principal
as a politician or a CEO, the agent as a bureaucrat or a division manager, and the
evaluator as the median voter or the labor market.
The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent, or delegate
the decision-making authority to the agent. The party who has the formal authority
chooses an action, x ∈ {0,1}. However, the outcomes also depend on the states of
the world, θ ∈ {0,1}, which are unobservable to the principal. We assume that each
state occurs with probability 1/2. The appropriate action is made if x = θ, where
the appropriateness of actions is evaluated by the evaluator’s point of view. While
the principal has no further information about θ, the agent can perfectly observe
it. That is, the agent is an expert and informational superior to the principal. On
the other hand, the evaluator can observe the realized θ and the implemented x,
although he may not be able to observe the allocation of authority, nor players’
types.
Information
Both the principal and the agent are either good (unbiased) or biased, in that the
good type party prefers the appropriate decisions, and the biased type always prefers
x = 1. Types are private information, so that the principal and the agent know their
own type, but not the other party’s type. The evaluator is also uncertain about both
the principal’s and the agent’s type. The common prior beliefs are that the principal
is good with probability µp ∈ (0,1) and biased with probability 1−µp, and that the
agent is good with probability µa ∈ (0,1) and biased with probability 1−µa. Thus,
µp can be interpreted as the principal’s ex ante reputation.
4Preferences
We assume that the principal receives the utility from the outcome and her ex post
reputation (i.e., the evaluator’s ex post beliefs about the principal being the good
type). Namely, the good principal’s utility function is
U
G
p (x,θ, ˆ µp) = −|x − θ| + γˆ µp, (1)
and the biased principal, who always prefers x = 1, has the utility function
U
B
p (x,θ, ˆ µp) = −|x − 1| + γˆ µp, (2)
where ˆ µp denotes the principal’s ex post reputation and γ > 0 is its relative impor-
tance.
The agent has no reputation concerns. Thus, the good agent’s utility function is
U
G
a (x,θ) = −|x − θ|, (3)
and the biased agent’s utility function is
U
B
a (x,θ) = −|x − 1|. (4)
Finally, the evaluator’s utility function is −|x − θ|.
Allocation of Authority
We assume that the principal is unable to commit to any implementation function.
More precisely, information about θ is soft so that the agent cannot verify it, and the
agent cannot announce his type in a credible way through the contracts, so that the
principal cannot elicit the agent’s private information via revelation mechanisms,
and thus, the agent is unconstrained in sending any message. The only variable the
principal can specify in the contracts is the allocation of authority (control rights).
5Initially, the principal keeps the control. Then, she can choose either the principal’s
discretion or the agent’s discretion.
Under the principal’s discretion, the principal keeps the decision-making author-
ity. The agent is requested to send a message m ∈ {0,1} to the principal about his
private information θ. Then the principal chooses an action based on the agent’s
message; that is, the principal and the agent play a cheap-talk game.
Under the agent’s discretion, the principal delegates the control right to the
agent, and thus the agent has the formal authority to make the decisions. In this
case, the principal can commit to never intervene in the agent’s decisions.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal chooses the allocation of decision-making authority.
2. The agent observes θ and sends a message m.
3. Given the allocation of authority, the party who has the formal authority
chooses x.
4. The evaluator observes the realized θ and x, and updates the principal’s rep-
utation (from µp to ˆ µp).
3 Benchmark: Fixed Discretion
We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case where the allocation of authority is ﬁxed, in
other words, the principal cannot choose the delegation policy. Instead, for example,
it is the evaluator who can choose the allocation of authority and commit to the
regime. In this case, the principal can only manipulate her ex post reputation by the
6policy she chooses. We will show that the agent’s discretion is always better than
the principal’s discretion from the evaluator’s view. However, as will be shown in
the next section, when principal can choose the allocation of authority, with positive
probability, the principal will keep the authority in equilibrium.
3.1 Principal’s Discretion
First, we consider the principal’s discretion. The principal and the agent play a
cheap-talk game in which the agent sends a message to the principal, and the prin-
cipal makes the decision after listening to the agent’s message. The evaluator,
however, cannot observe the agent’s advices.
Here, we only focus on an informative (nonbabbling) equilibrium in the cheap
talk game.4 In this equilibrium, the good principal always chooses x = 0 if m = 0.
However, as in Morris (2001), because of the reputation concern, there exist some
equilibria in which the good principal may make a wrong decision in order to be
distinguished from the biased type; that is, she chooses x = 0 when she believes
that θ = 1 happens. On the other hand, the biased principal always chooses x = 1 if
m = 1, but she may choose x = 0 when she believes that θ = 0 happens, in order to
mimic the good type and gain some ex post reputation. To assure that there exists
such an equilibrium, we make one assumption:
Assumption 1 1
1−µp > γ.
Assumption 1 is satisﬁed if the principal is good with suﬃciently large prob-
ability and/or the principal’s reputation concern is not too large. The following
4As in the standard cheap-talk game as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), there exist babbling
equilibria in which messages do not convey any information. For example, if the agent of both
types always send m = 1 regardless of θ, then the principal learns nothing from the message,
and simply puts probability 1/2 to each state. Given this principal’s belief, both types have no
incentives to deviate from their uninformative announcements.
7proposition characterizes the properties of this equilibrium.
Proposition 1
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Under the principal’s discretion, there exists an
equilibrium which satisﬁes,
1. The good agent always sends m = θ, and the biased agent always sends m = 1.
2. If m = 0, then the good principal always chooses x = 0, and if m = 1, she
chooses x = 1 with probability ν∗
G ∈ [0,1].
3. If m = 1, then the biased principal chooses x = 1, and if m = 0, the biased
principal always chooses x = 0 with probability ν∗
B ∈ [0,1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let ˆ µp(x,θ,ν∗
G,ν∗
B) be the principal’s ex post reputation when the evaluator ob-
serves (x,θ). We have
ˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB) =
µp[µa + (1 − µa)(1 − νG)]








µp(1 − µa)νG + (1 − µp)[µa(1 − νB) + (1 − µa)]
, (7)
ˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB) = 1. (8)
According to equations (5) − (8), we have the following result:
8Corollary 1
ˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB) ≥ ˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB) ≥ µp ≥ ˆ µp(1,1,νG,νB) ≥ ˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB).
For the biased principal, she has a tendency to choose x = 1; however, because of
reputation concern, she may choose x = 0 when m = 0 with positive probability ν∗
B
to pretend as a good one, since ˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB) is decreasing in νB and ˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB)
is non-decreasing in νB. Although the evaluator tends to regard the principal as
the biased one when he observes (x,θ) = (1,0), ν∗
B = 1 cannot be a part of the
equilibrium, because it implies that the evaluator would not be able to distinguish
the good type from the biased one, and thus the biased type can choose x = 1
without damaging her reputation. Therefore, ν∗
B < 1. On the other hand, the good
principal may choose x = 0 when m = 1 in order to show that she is unbiased, since
ˆ µp(1,1,νG,νB) is increasing in νG, although it causes some loss for her from making
such a wrong decision. As for the agent’s behavior, the good agent always sends
m = θ as long as the principal regards that the agent’s messages are informative. The
biased agent has no incentive to send m = 0 since he can induce x = 1 by sending





B are non-decreasing in µa.
The biased principal prefers x = 0 if she could jeopardize her ex post reputation
ˆ µp(1,0,ν∗
G,ν∗
B) too much when she chooses x = 1. Since ˆ µp(1,0,ν∗
G,ν∗
B) decreases in
µa, the higher µa, the more likely that the evaluator thinks that this wrong decision
is made by the biased principal. Therefore, in order to keep a good reputation,
the biased principal has more incentives to keep accountable. The case of the good
principal is similar.
Accordingly, under the principal’s discretion (denoted by P), the expected utility
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When the agent has the decision-making authority, he can choose his ideal decisions
at will by using his private information. Obviously, the good agent chooses x = θ,
and the biased agent always chooses x = 1 regardless of θ.
Thus, under the agent’s discretion (denoted by A), the good principal’s expected
utility in equilibrium is
EU
G
p (A) = −
1
2
(1 − µa) + γµp, (11)
and the biased principal’s expected utility is
EU
B
p (A) = −
1
2
µa + γµp. (12)
Note that the principal’s reputation is not updated since, under the agent’s discre-
tion, the evaluator has no access to any information about the principal’s type.
3.3 Principal’s Discretion vs. Agent’s Discretion
So far, we assume that the allocation of authority is ﬁxed or beyond the principal’s
control. From the evaluator’s view, the optimal decision is x = θ. If θ = 1,
10x = 1 is implemented for sure under the agent’s discretion, but with probability
µpν∗
G + (1 − µp) under the principal discretion. If θ = 0, x = 0 is implemented with
probability µa under the agent’s discretion, and with probability µa(µp+(1−µp)ν∗
B)
under the principal’s discretion. Since ν∗
B < 1, the agent’s discretion is always
better than the principal’s discretion for the evaluator. Thus, if it is possible to ﬁx
the regime, the evaluator prefers the agent’s discretion. The reason for this result
is that there are double-sided biases under the principal’s discretion (from both
the agent’s bias in communication and the principal’s bias in decision-making),
while there is only one-sided bias under the agent’s discretion. The result can be
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
Under ﬁxed discretion, the evaluator prefers the agent’s discretion.
4 Principal’s Delegation Policy
If the principal has the power to decide the allocation of authority, and the evaluator
cannot observe it, the evaluator must guess who actually makes the decisions. In
equilibrium, the evaluator’s conjucture must be consistent with the principal’s choice
of the allocation.
Let αG (resp. αB) be the probability that the good (resp. biased) principal keeps
the decision-making authority. Thus, given the evaluator’s beliefs, ˆ αG and ˆ αB, he
believes that the decision-making authority belongs to the principal with probability
µpˆ αG +(1−µp)ˆ αB, and to the agent with probability 1−(µpˆ αG +(1−µp)ˆ αB). We
will still focus on the informative equilibrium as in the last section.
In the last period, the evaluator observes θ and x, and forms his beliefs on αG, αB,
and νG, νB. As before, the good agent chooses x = θ and the biased agent chooses
11x = 1 under the agent’s discretion. Therefore, the principal’s ex post reputations
ˆ µp(x,θ,νG,νB, ˆ αG, ˆ αB) ≡ ˜ µp(x,θ,νG,νB) become
˜ µp(0,0,νG,νB) =
µp[ˆ αG(µa + (1 − µa)(1 − νG)) + (1 − ˆ αG)µa]
µp[ˆ αG(µa + (1 − µa)(1 − νG)) + (1 − ˆ αG)µa] + (1 − µp)µa[ˆ αBνB + (1 − ˆ αB)]
(13)
˜ µp(1,1,νG,νB) =
µp[ˆ αGνG + (1 − ˆ αG)]
µp[ˆ αGνG + (1 − ˆ αG)] + (1 − µp)
(14)
˜ µp(1,0,νG,νB) =
µp[ˆ αG(1 − µa)νG + (1 − ˆ αG)(1 − µa)]
µp[ˆ αG(1 − µa)νG + (1 − ˆ αG)(1 − µa)] + (1 − µp)[ˆ αB(1 − µaνB) + (1 − ˆ αB)(1 − µa)]
(15)
˜ µp(0,1,νG,νB) = 1 (16)
4.1 The Biased Principal
First, consider the biased principal’s decision making under the principal’s discretion
at period 3. Let ν∗∗
B be the equilibrium probability that the biased principal chooses
x = 0 when m = 0 for any given (ˆ αG, ˆ αB). We have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Given the evaluator’s beliefs (ˆ αG, ˆ αB), ν∗∗
B ≤ ν∗
B must hold. Furthermore,
if ˆ αB < 1 and ν∗
B ∈ (0,1), then ν∗∗
B < ν∗
B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that if the evaluator believes that the biased principal may delegate
with some probability, i.e., ˆ αB < 1, the probability that the biased principal chooses
x = 0 when m = 0 cannot be greater than that of the case where the evaluator
knows that the principal has the authority. The reason is simple. The incentive for
the biased agent to choose x = 0 comes from her reputation concerns. From (13)
and (15), one can check that the smaller ˆ αB, the smaller ˜ µp(0,0,νG,νB) and the
12larger ˜ µp(1,0,νG,νB). In this case, the biased principal tends to choose x = 1 even
when m = 0. Since ν∗
B corresponds to the case ˆ αB = 1, ν∗∗
B ≤ ν∗
B must be the case.
Now, let us consider the biased principal’s delegation policy. Let αB∗ be the
probability in equilibrium that the biased principal keeps decision-making authority.
We can show the following proposition.
Proposition 3
αB∗ ∈ (0,1]. Moreover, αB∗ = 1 if and only if ν∗∗
B = 0.
The biased principal faces a trade-oﬀ between her reputation concerns and her
preferred decisions. Consider the case in which the evaluator believes that ˆ αB = 0,
that is, the agent has the authority. In this case, the biased principal can deviate to
keeping the authority and choosing x = 1 without damaging her reputation, since
the evaluator believes that the decision is made by the agent. Thus, the biased
principal has the incentive to keep the authority with some positive probability.
On the other hand, suppose that the evaluator believes that ˆ αB = 1, that is, the
principal makes the decisions. In this case, the biased principal could deteriorate
her reputation if she chooses her ideal action x = 1. Therefore, if the reputation is
suﬃciently important, she should choose αB < 1. Otherwise, she would rather keep
the authority and always choose her preferred policy, x = 1, when reputation is not
a crucial concern.
4.2 The Good Principal
Next, consider the good principal’s delegation policy. Let ν∗∗
G be the equilibrium
probability that the good principal chooses x = 1 when m = 1 given the evaluator’s
beliefs (ˆ αG, ˆ αB). We have the the following result:
13Proposition 4
1. Given any (ˆ αG, ˆ αB), αG∗ ∈ [0,1] can be an equilibrium.
2. If ν∗∗
G = 0, then αG∗ = 1. If ν∗∗
G ∈ (0,1), then αG∗ ∈ (0,1). If ν∗∗





Proof. See the Appendix.
Similar to the biased principal, when x = 0 is always the best for the good
principal at m = 1, she will keep the authority. Otherwise, with less important
reputation concern, she prefers delegation sometimes and behaves more accountable.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Reputation Concerns
From Proposition 3 and 4, because of reputation concerns, we can see that in general,
the principal keep too much authority. However, reputation concerns have diﬀerent
eﬀects delegation policy for the principal of diﬀerent types. When γ is small, the
biased principal prefers keeping the authority and makes her ideal policy. The good
one is in fact indiﬀerent between keeping the authority and delegation, because in
both cases, it is better to make the correct decisions. When γ is large, the biased
principal prefers delegation because it is costly to make the biased policy. The
good one prefers keeping the authority, and makes policy x = 0 in order to be
distinguished from the biased one. When γ is intermediate, then it is possible that
both types delegate sometimes. Since delegation is always better for the evaluator,
the case is best for the evaluator.
Under principal’s discretion in the ﬁxed regime case, the only tool that the
principal can apply is making the right decisions. In contrast, when the evaluator
believes that the agent may make the decision sometimes, the principal has another
14way to manipulate her ex post reputation. Since the evaluator cannot observe who
indeed makes the decision, the principal would take this advantage and has more
incentives to make the policy she prefers (i.e., x = 1 is made by the biased type and
x = 0 by the good type more often), and blames on the agent for wrong decisions.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate how the principal strategically allocates the decision-
making authority when she has reputation concerns. When the agent is informa-
tional superior to the principal, the basic trade-oﬀ for the principal is between
implementing the ideal decisions and maintaining her ex post reputation. We argue
that delegation can provide a way for the principal to manipulate her ex post rep-
utation. In general, the principal keeps the authority too often when she has the
opportunity of delegation. When the evaluator believes that the agent may make
the decision sometimes, the principal has less incentive to follow the agent’s advices
and would like to make her preferred policy more often.
Our results depend upon some restrictive assumptions. First we limit our at-
tention to an informative equilibrium in which the good (biased) principal always
follows the agent’s recommendations when m = 0 (when m = 1). A more general
analysis on optimal delegation policy in all equilibria is called for. In Appendix
B, we reconsider Proposition 1 by including all possible cases. Second, our results
depend upon the unobservability of the allocation of authority. For example, if the
evaluator not only can observe what decisions have been made, but also who makes
them, then the evaluator can evaluate principal’s ability by their allocation policy.
Since delegation to the agent appears to be a bad signal for the principal, the biased
principal may also want to keep the authority. Although the formation of the dele-
gation policy in this paper is somehow restricted, we extract the eﬀect of principal’s
15reputation concerns on the allocation of authority, which has been neglected very
much so far in the large literatures on organization theory.
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17Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove Proposition 1, we make several claims as follows.
Claim 1
Suppose that the good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent sends m = 1
always. Also, suppose that the good principal always chooses x = 0 if m = 0, and
chooses x = 1 with probability ν∗
G ∈ [0,1] if m = 1. Then, the biased principal always
chooses x = 1 if m = 1, and chooses x = 0 with probability ν∗
B ∈ [0,1) if m = 0.
Proof.
If the biased principal chooses x = 1 when m = 1, she obtains γˆ µp(1,1,νG,νB).
If she instead chooses x = 0, she gets −1 + γˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB). If Assumption 1 is
satisﬁed, there exists a ν∗
G such that
γˆ µp(1,1,νG,νB) > −1 + γˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB) = −1 + γ, (17)
and thus she chooses x = 1.
Suppose m = 0. If she implements x = 1, then her expected utility be-
comes γˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB). If she implements x = 0, her expected utility is −1 +
γˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB). If νB = 1, it must be −1 + γˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB) > γˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB).
In this case, ˆ µp(1,1,νG,νB) = ˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB). According to (17), it implies that
ˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB) > ˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB), which is not possible. Therefore, it must be νB < 1
and so
−1 + γˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB) ≤ γˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB). (18)
18Claim 2
Suppose that the good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent always sends
m = 1. Furthermore, suppose that the biased principal chooses x = 1 when m = 1,
and x = 0 with probability ν∗
B ∈ [0,1) when m = 0. Then, the good principal always
chooses x = 0 if m = 0, and chooses x = 1 with probability ν∗
G ∈ [0,1] if m = 1.
Proof.
When m = 0, if the good principal chooses x = 0, she obtains γˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB). If
she instead chooses x = 1, she gets −1 + γˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB). Thus, regardless of νB
and γ, she chooses x = 0 based on Corollary 1.
When m = 1, if she implements x = 0, then her expected utility becomes
1
2[−1 + γˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB)] + 1
2(1 − µa)γˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB). If she chooses x = 1 instead,




G < 1 if

− 1 + γˆ µp(0,1,νG,νB)

+ (1 − µa)γˆ µp(0,0,νG,νB)
≥ γˆ µp(1,1,νG,νB) + (1 − µa)

− 1 + γˆ µp(1,0,νG,νB)

(19)
Especially, if γ <
µa
2−µa, it cannot be ν∗
G = 0, since we have ˆ µp(1,1) = ˆ µp(1,0) = 0
and ˆ µp(0,1) = ˆ µp(0,0) = 1 (because ν∗
B = 0). Thus, that she will implement x = 1
with a positive νG.
Claim 3
Suppose that the good principal always chooses x = 0 if m = 0, and chooses x = 1
with probability ν∗
G ∈ [0,1] if m = 1. Also suppose that the biased principal chooses
x = 1 when m = 1, and x = 0 with probability ν∗
B ∈ [0,1) when m = 0. Then, the
good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent always sends m = 1.
Proof.
19Suppose that the agent observes θ = 1. Then, for the agent of both types, x = 1 is
the optimal decision. x = 0 is chosen with probability (1−µp)ν∗
B if he sends m = 0,
and x = 1 is chosen with probability µpν∗
G + (1 − µp) when he sends m = 1. Thus,
both types send m = 1 if θ = 1.
Next, suppose that the agent observes θ = 0. Then, x = 0 is optimal for the
good agent, and x = 1 is optimal for the biased agent. Since x = 0 is chosen with
probability µp +(1−µp)ν∗
B if he sends m = 0, and x = 1 is chosen with probability
µpν∗
G when he sends m = 1, it is optimal for the good agent to send m = 0. For the
biased agent, the similar argument applies and he always send m = 1 since the best
decision for him is x = 1.
Claim 1, 2, and 3 prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 1.
First of all, we deﬁne ˜ µp(x,θ,νG,νB) ≡ ˆ µp(x,θ,νG,νB, ˆ αG, ˆ αB), given the evalu-
ator’s beliefs on ˆ αG and ˆ αB. Suppose that the biased principal receives a message
m = 0. Then, if she chooses x = 0, her expected utility becomes
−1 + γ˜ µp(0,0,νG,νB)
and if she chooses x = 1, she obtains
γ˜ µp(1,0,νG,νB)
At any equilibrium such that ν∗∗









B )] ≤ 1 (20)
must hold. Note ˜ µp(0,0,νG,νB) − ˜ µp(1,0,νG,νB) is increasing in αG and αB, but
decreasing in νB. Since ν∗
B corresponds to the solution where αG = αB = 1, and
20ν∗
B > 0 satisﬁes γ[ˆ µp(0,0,ν∗
G,ν∗
B) − ˆ µp(1,0,ν∗
G,ν∗
B)] ≤ 1, we must have ν∗∗
B ≤ ν∗
B.
Furthermore, if γ[ˆ µp(0,0,ν∗
G,ν∗
B) − ˆ µp(1,0,ν∗
G,ν∗
B)] = 1, i.e., ν∗
B ∈ (0,1), then in
order to satisfy γ[˜ µp(0,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗
B )− ˜ µp(1,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗




Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose that the evaluator believes that the biased principal keeps the authority
with probability of ˆ αB. Then, the biased principal’s expected payoﬀ when keeping































On the other hand, when the biased principal delegates the authority (i.e., αB = 0),




































B < 1 as well. As in (20), ν∗∗
B ∈ (0,1) if and only if
γ˜ µp(1,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗




B > 0 holds for a given ˆ αB, from (21) and (22), we can see that
keeping the authority and delegating to the agent is indiﬀerent for the biased prin-
cipal since γ˜ µp(1,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗
B ) = −1 + γ˜ µp(0,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗
B ). Then, the biased principal
can choose optimally αB∗ = ˆ αB ∈ (0,1).
21However, ˆ αB = 0 cannot be supported as the equilibrium since νB = 0 at
ˆ αB = 0, which implies that (21) is strictly greater than (22) (since in this case,
ˆ µp(0,0,ν,0) = ˆ µp(1,0,ν,0) = µp), so that ˆ αB should be 1.
Next, if ν∗∗
B = 0 for a given ˆ αB, then ˜ µp(1,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗
B ) > −1 + γ˜ µp(0,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗
B )
must be the case. It follows that (21) is always greater than (22), and then the bi-
ased principal chooses αB∗ = 1. Hence, as long as αB∗ < 1, ν∗∗
B > 0 must be the case.
Proof of Proposition 4.







B ) + (1 − µa)
h
(1 − νG)γ˜ µp(0,0,ν∗∗
G ,ν∗∗































































B ) + (1 − µa)









G = 1, the good principal is indiﬀerent between keeping and delegating the
authority. If αG∗ ∈ (0,1), ν∗∗









B ) decrease in ˆ αG and increase in νG, if αG∗ < 1 then ν∗∗
G < ν∗
G.
22Appendix B: Generalized Proposition 1
In this appendix, we want to show Proposition 1 by considering all possible cases.
Let νG(m) be the probability that the good principal chooses x = 0 when she receives
message m from the agent. Similarly, let νB(m) be that for the biased principal.
The following proposition characterizes the properties of the principal’s equilibrium
strategy under the principal’s discretion.
Proposition 1*
Under the principal’s discretion, the equilibrium satisﬁes:
1. The good agent sends m = θ always.
2. The biased agent sends m = 1 always.
3. The good principal’s equilibrium strategy satisﬁes νG(0) = 1 and νG(1) ∈ [0,1].
4. The biased principal’s equilibrium strategy satisﬁes νB(0) ≤ νG(0) = 1 and
νB(1) ≤ νG(1).
Proof.
First of all, we distinguish three kinds of equilibria as follows:
1. Most informative equilibrium: the good principal’s strategy satisﬁes νG(0) = 1
and νG(1) = 0, and the biased principal’s strategy satisﬁes νB(0) ∈ [0,1) and
νB(1) = 0.
2. Pooling equilibrium (uninformative equilibrium): νG(m) = νB(m) = 1 for
m = 0,1.
3. Informative equilibrium: νG(0) = 1 and νG(1) ∈ (0,1), and νB(0) < νG(0) = 1
and νB(1) ≤ νG(1).
23Whether an equilibrium is informative or not depends upon a level of γ.
Suppose that the good agent sends m = θ and the biased agent sends m = 1
always. Then, the principal has beliefs Prob{θ = 0|m = 0} = 1, and Prob{θ =
1|m = 1} = 1
1+(1−µa) > 1




Suppose that the good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent sends m = 1
always. Then, there can be the equilibrium under which (i) the good principal makes
decision x = m (correct decision), and (ii) the biased principal chooses x = 1 when
m = 1, and x = 1 with probability νB(0) ∈ [0,1) when m = 0.
Proof.
First of all, suppose that the good principal always chooses x = m. Then the
biased principal chooses x = 1 when m = 1. Suppose not. By choosing x = 1,
the biased principal can increase her reputation (since the good principal chooses
x = 1 if m = 1) and induce x = 1. Suppose that the biased principal receives
m = 0. If she implements x = 0, then her expected utility becomes −1+γˆ µp(0,0,ν).
If she implements x = 1, her expected utility is γˆ µp(1,0,ν). We can easily see
for any value of ν, −1 + γˆ µp(0,0,ν) ≤ γˆ µp(1,0,ν) holds. Therefore, ν∗ < 1. If
−1 + γˆ µp(0,0,ν) = γˆ µp(1,0,ν), then some ν∗ ∈ (0,1) is the equilibrium. If −1 +
γˆ µp(0,0,ν) < γˆ µp(1,0,ν) for every value of ν, then ν∗ = 0 is the equilibrium.
Next, suppose that the good principal chooses x = m on the equilibrium path.
Thus, neither type of the principal chooses x = 0 when m = 1. That is, (x,θ) = (0,1)
is oﬀ the equilibrium path. We assume that ˆ µp(0,1,ν) = µp is the oﬀ-equilibrium
belief for this event. Given this, by choosing x = 0 when m = 1, the good principal
24obtains the expected utility 1
2[−1+γµp]+ 1
2(1−µa)γˆ µp(0,0,ν). If she chooses x = 1
instead, her expected utility is 1
2γˆ µp(1,1,ν) + 1
2(1 − µa)[−1 + γˆ µp(1,0,ν)], where
ˆ µp(1,1) = µp. Thus, if µa+(1−µa)γ[ˆ µp(1,0,ν)− ˆ µp(0,0,ν)] > 0, the good principal
chooses x = 1 when m = 1.
Pooling Equilibrium
Claim 5
Suppose that the good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent sends m = 1
always. Then, there can be the equilibrium under which either type of the principal
chooses x = 0.
Proof.
Under the pooling equilibrium, the ex post reputation always coincides with the ex
ante one, that is ˆ µp = µp. Now suppose that the biased principal receives m = 0. If
she implements x = 0, then her expected utility becomes −1+γµp. If she implements
x = 1, her expected utility is γ˜ µp, where ˜ µp is the oﬀ the equilibrium path belief.
Thus, as long as −1 + γµp ≥ γ˜ µp is satisﬁed, the biased principal chooses x = 0 if
m = 0. We assume ˜ µp = 0 as the oﬀ equilibrium belief. Then, if γ is suﬃciently
large, the biased agent chooses x = 0 if m = 0. Similar argument applies if the
biased principal receives m = 1.
Next, suppose that the good principal receives m = 0. In this case, she has no
incentive to choose x = 1 with ˜ µp = 0 since γµp > −1 always. If the good principal
receives m = 1, then, by choosing x = 0, her utility becomes −1+γµp, and becomes
γ˜ µp if x = 1. Thus, as in the case of the biased principal, if γ is suﬃciently large,
then the good principal chooses x = 0.
25Informative Equilibrium
Besides the most informative equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium, any equi-
librium can be characterized by the following claim.
Claim 6
Suppose that the good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent sends m = 1
always. Then, any equilibrium strategy which is not most informative or pooling
satisﬁes (i) νG(0) = 1 and νG(1) ∈ (0,1], (ii) νB(0) ∈ [0,1) and νB(1) ∈ (0,1), and
(iii) νB(0) < νG(0) and νB(1) ≤ νG(1).
Proof.
The idea of thte proof is basically similar to Morris (2001). Let ˆ µp(x,θ,νB(m),νG(m))
be the ex post belief on the principal’s type for given νB(m) and νG(m). Then,
ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)) =
µp(1 − νG(1))




µpνG(1) + (1 − µp)νB(1)
(28)
ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)) = (29)
µaµp(1 − νG(0)) + (1 − µa)µp(1 − νG(1))
µa[µp(1 − νG(0)) + (1 − µp)(1 − νB(0))] + (1 − µa)[µp(1 − νG(1)) + (1 − µp)(1 − νB(1))]
ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)) =
µaµpνG(0) + (1 − µa)µpνG(1)
µa[µpνG(0) + (1 − µp)νB(0)] + (1 − µa)[µpνG(1) + (1 − µp)νB(1)]
(30)
Step 1 ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)) = ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) = ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m))=
ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)) is a pooling equilibrium and is therefore neglected.
Step 2 ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥ ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)).
26Suppose that ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) < ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)). Then, the bi-
ased principal has no incentive to choose x = 0 when m = 1, and νB(1) = 0.
In this case, if νG(1) = 0, ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)) = µp, and the equilibrium be-
comes the most informative equilibrium. If νG(1) > 0, ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥
ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)). Contradiction.
Step 3 ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥ ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)).
Suppose that ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)) < ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)). Then, the bi-
ased principal has no incentive to choose x = 0 when m = 0, and νB(0) = 0. In
this case, the good principal has a strong incentive to choose x = 0 when m = 0
since ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) > ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)) as long as νG(0) > 0.
Contradiction.
Step 4 νG(0) = 1.
Clearly, ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥ ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)).
Step 5 ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥ ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)), and νG(1) ≤ νG(0) = 1.
Note that νG(0) = 1. Then, straight calculations give us ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m))
≥ ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)). Also, this inequality implies νG(1) ≤ νG(0) = 1.
Step 6 ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥ ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)).
Suppose not. Then, we have ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m)) < ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)).
Note that νG(1) ≤ νG(0) = 1. Then, in order to satisfy above inequality, we
must have νB(1) ≤ νB(0). But this contradicts to ˆ µp(0,0,νB(m),νG(m)) ≥
ˆ µp(1,0,νB(m),νG(m)).
Step 7 νB(0) < νG(0) = 1.
The argument is similar to Claim 1.
27Step 8 νB(1) ≤ νG(1).
Suppose not. Then νB(1) > νG(1). But it contradicts to ˆ µp(0,1,νB(m),νG(m))
≥ ˆ µp(1,1,νB(m),νG(m)).
Claim 7
The good agent always sends m = θ and the biased agent always sends m = 1 in
equilibrium.
Proof.
Suppose that the agent observes θ = 1. Then, for the agent of both types, x = 1
is the optimal decision. Since the principal chooses x = 1 with positive probability
when m = 1 except in the pooling equilibrium, and chooses x = 0 more often when
m = 0 than m = 1, both types send m = 1 if θ = 1. In the pooling equilibrium,
the agent’s message cannot aﬀect on the principal’s decision making, and thus the
agent of both types can send m = 1 on the equilibrium path.
Next, suppose that the agent observes θ = 0. Then, x = 0 is optimal for the
good agent, and x = 1 is optimal for the biased agent. Since x = 0 is chosen
with probability µp + (1 − µp)νB(0) if he sends m = 0, and x = 0 is chosen with
probability of µpνG(1) + (1 − µp)νB(1) < µp + (1 − µp)νB(0) when he sends m = 1,
it is optimal for the good agent to send m = 0. For the biased agent, the similar
argument applies and he always send m = 1 since the best decision for him is x = 1.
Claim 4, 5, 6 and 7 prove Proposition 1*.
28